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Abstract—This paper investigates the incremental-redundancy
hybrid-automatic repeat request (IR-HARQ) transmission over
independent block-fading channels in the presence of an eaves-
dropper, where the secrecy of the transmission is ensured via
introduction of dummy-messages. Since the encoder only knows
the statistics of the channel state, the secrecy and the reliability
are defined in a probabilistic framework. Unlike previous works
on this subject, we design a coding strategy tailored to IR-
HARQ by splitting the dummy-message rate over several rate
parameters. These additional degrees of freedom improve the
match between the dummy-message rates and the realizations of
the eavesdropper channels. We evaluate the performance in terms
of secrecy outage probability, connection outage probability and
throughput and we compare it with the benchmark paper by
Tang et al. [2]. Numerical examples illustrate that, comparing
to existing alternatives, splitting of the dummy-message rate
provides higher throughput and lower expected duration/average
delay.
Index Terms—hybrid automatic repeat request, physical layer
security, state-dependent wiretap channel, channel state informa-
tion, secrecy outage probability and secrecy throughput.
I. INTRODUCTION
This work is concerned with the transmission of information
over wireless independent block-fading channels, where the
channel state information (CSI), which captures the essence
of channel statistics, is not available at the transmitter but
can be estimated by the receivers. In such a scenario, the
transmission is inherently i) unreliable due to unpredictable
fading, and ii) unsecure due to the possibility of eavesdrop-
ping when communicating over a broadcast medium. The
successful communication and the secrecy can thus only
be defined/guaranteed in probabilistic terms. The principal
question we want to investigate is how the constraints on the
secrecy and the reliability are related when transmissions are
carried out using an incremental-redundancy hybrid-automatic
repeat request (IR-HARQ) protocol, and how to construct the
coding to take advantage of the additional dimension offered
by retransmissions.
A. State of art
Reliability and IR-HARQ
Reliability is a key issue in modern communications and is
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deeply related to the knowledge—by the transmitters—of the
channel statistics often summarized in one parameter, which
defines the CSI, e.g., the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). When
both encoder and decoder know the CSI it is possible to design
an appropriate coding scheme that conveys information with
arbitrary reliability [3]. When the CSI is unavailable at the
transmitter, the successful transmission cannot be guaranteed
leading to the concepts of outage probability and throughput.
To deal with unavoidable transmission errors, the so-called
hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ) protocol is often
used: a single-bit acknowledgement feedback (Ack/Nack)
indicates whether the decoding was successful or not. Then,
the transmitter may transmit the same message many times, till
it is successfully received–the event indicated by the Ack. The
two main classes of HARQ protocols are i) Repetition Time
Diversity (RTD), which consists in repeated transmission of
the same codeword, and ii) Incremental Redundancy (IR), a
more powerful scheme which involves a different codebook
in each transmission. HARQ protocols were analyzed in
the literature from the point of view of throughput, outage
probability, and average delay, e.g., [4]–[9].
Retransmissions in HARQ provide additional degrees of
freedom which can be exploited to design a code which
provides a suitable “match” between the transmission rate and
the channel realizations. For example, in [10]–[19], the length
of codewords was varied throughout the retransmissions. A
different approach was taken by [20]–[26] which kept the
codeword length constant and rather relied on the design of
new coding schemes to increase the throughput.
Secrecy
Security is an issue in wireless communications due to the
broadcast nature of the transmission medium. An eavesdropper
within the communication range can “overhear” the transmit-
ted signals and extract some private information.
Instead of using cryptographic methods to protect the mes-
sage, Wyner [27] proposed to exploit the difference between
the legitimate decoder and the eavesdropper channels, and
characterized the rate at which the legitimate users can com-
municate not only reliably but also securely. The threat model
of [27] refers to the one of Shannon’s cipher system [28],
defined in an information-theoretic sense, also referred to as
“Physical Layer Security”. In particular, the eavesdropper is
assumes to have arbitrary equipment and computing power
and to know the existence of a message intended to the
legitimate receiver [28, pp. 656]. The eavesdropper is aware of
2the code-book used in encoding and decoding operations [27,
pp. 1355]. Perfect secrecy is defined by the condition that, for
any eavesdropper’s observation the a-posteriori probabilities
are equal to the a-priori probabilities [28, pp. 679]. The goal
is to exploit the intrinsic randomness of the channel in order
to secure the transmission.1
The results of [27] were further generalized in [29], [30]
under assumption of CSI knowledge, which has a significant
impact on security in wireless networks [31]. In [32], the
authors proved that secure communication is possible even
when the eavesdropper has, on average, a channel stronger
than that of the receiver. However, the legitimate users must
have perfect knowledge of their CSI and estimate the CSI
of the eavesdropper. In [33], the problem of broadcasting
confidential messages to multiple receivers over parallel and
fast-fading channels was investigated while [34] characterizes
the secrecy capacity of slow-fading wiretap channel under
different CSI assumptions. The ergodic secrecy capacity was
characterized in [35] assuming full CSI at both legitimate
transmitters.
The assumption of the knowledge of the eavesdropper’s
CSI is an idealization,2 so [36] studied the case where the
channel to the eavesdropper experiences fading not known to
the legitimate users. The effect of partial CSI on achievable
secure communication rates and on secret-key generation was
also investigated in [37], and [38] provided bounds on the
ergodic secrecy capacity. The case of transmission without
CSI at the encoder was investigated in [39], where the ergodic
secrecy capacity for fast fading wiretap channel was charac-
terized; and in [40], which proposed an alternative secrecy
outage formulation to measure the probability that message
transmission fails to achieve perfect secrecy.
Secrecy and HARQ
Retransmissions in HARQ may be used not only to increase
the reliability or the throughput, but also to increase the se-
crecy. This issue was investigated in [2] using extension of the
Wyner code [27] with the introduction of dummy messages. In
the absence of CSI, the coding parameters were chosen using
the statistics of the CSI. Then, receiving a Nack feedback,
the encoder retransmits the message but has no guarantee
of reliability nor secrecy which are then characterized via
the random events of secrecy outage and connection outage.
Improvement of the secure HARQ protocol was investigated in
[41], [42] with variable-length coding and in [43] using low-
density parity-check (LDPC) codes. In [44], the authors in-
vestigate secure HARQ protocols based on multiple encoding,
by using new dummy-messages at each transmission. In [45],
the author exploits the channel reciprocity assumption in order
to transmit securely even if the channel to the eavesdropper
is less noisy than the channel to the legitimate decoder. In
that case, the channel state information shared by the pair of
legitimate transmitters can be used as a secret key.
It is worthwhile to mention that the notion of secrecy
may be defined in many different ways, including “perfect”,
1Note that we use here secrecy, as the only mean to guarantee the security
of a transmission, but secrecy can be combined with cryptography as well.
2There is no reason that eavesdropper would collaborate with the legitimate
users.
“weak” and “strong secrecy” [31], “effective secrecy”, “pri-
vacy” and “stealth” [46], “semantic security” [47], [48], or
“covert communications” [49], [50]. Each of these notions
provides different degrees of secrecy, based on probabilistic
arguments or worst case scenarios.
The goal of this work is not to investigate the comparison
between these different notions but rather to develop a coding
scheme tailored for HARQ transmissions. We use the same
secrecy metric, namely “weak secrecy”, as in the previous
articles on that subject [2], [44] which also follow Wyner’s
work [27].
In this paper we investigate the canonical model of indepen-
dent block-fading channels and we focus only on IR-HARQ
protocol because it offers new degrees of freedom in the code
design; on the other hand, these degrees of freedom are, by
definition, absent from the RTD coding.
B. Contributions and organizations
A natural trade-off arises between reliability and security in
the wiretap channel: when the dummy-message rate increases,
it decreases the secrecy outage probability but increases the
connection outage probability. One important drawback of
the coding schemes proposed in [2], is that the dummy-
message rate is unique and should guarantee the secrecy
for a large number of possible transmissions, even if the
expected duration/average delay of the transmission is much
lower. In this work, we address this issue upfront and design
an original wiretap code by splitting the dummy-message
rate over several rate parameters. These additional degrees of
freedom improve the match between the dummy-message rates
and the realization of the eavesdropper channels. The article
[2] is clearly the benchmark for this work. Our contributions
are the following:
• We propose a novel wiretap code, called “Adaptation-
Secrecy-Rate-code” (ASR-code) that splits the dummy-
message into multiple dummy-messages and inserts them
into upcoming packets. We prove that ASR-code has
an arbitrarily small error probability and an arbitrarily
small information leakage rate, for a whole set of channel
states. In our view, the ASR-code generalizes the coding
scheme presented in [2] in a very natural manner as, for a
particular choice of the dummy-message rates, the ASR-
code is equivalent to the coding proposed in [2].
• We characterize the trade-off between connection and
secrecy outage probabilities and show the optimal rate
allocation for discrete channels and for Rayleigh fading
channels with one transmission.
• We present a numerical optimization for multiple trans-
missions over Rayleigh fading channel: using the splitting
of the dummy-message rate, we achieve a higher through-
put with a lower expected duration/average delay.
• ASR-code provides better performances than the proto-
cols of [2] and [44] for discrete and Gaussian channels.
The main differences with our previous work [1] are:
• We consider an arbitrary number of possible retransmis-
sions, whereas only one retransmission was considered in
3[1]; this affects non-trivially the expressions of connec-
tion and secrecy outages probabilities.
• We consider a more practical case of Rayleigh block-
fading channels and analyze the corresponding solutions.
• We provide a full version of the proof of Theorem 4,
while only a sketch was shown in [1].
The work is organized as follows. Sec. II presents the
channel model under investigation, the HARQ-code and de-
fines our new protocol called ASR-code. The main result is
Theorem 4 which proves that the error probability and the
information leakage rate converge to zero for large block
length. The performance of the ASR-code is measured by
the secrecy throughput and the secrecy/connection outage
probability, defined in Sec. III-A. The example of a discrete
channel state is shown in Sec. III-B whereas Rayleigh fading
channels are investigated in Sec. IV. Sec. V concludes the
paper and the proofs of the results are stated in the Appendix.
II. SECURE HARQ PROTOCOL
We consider a HARQ protocol with L possible transmis-
sions shown schematically in Fig. 1 for L = 2. Each transmis-
sion l ∈ {1, . . . , L} corresponds to a block of n ∈ N symbols.
Capital letter X denotes the random variable, lowercase letter
x ∈ X denotes the realization and Xn denotes the n-time
Cartesian product of the set X . The random message M ∈M
is uniformly distributed and m ∈M denotes the realization.
During the first transmission, the encoder C uses the se-
quence of input symbols xn1 ∈ X
n in order to transmit the
message m ∈ M to the legitimate decoder D. The decoder
D (resp. eavesdropper E) observes the sequence of channel
outputs yn1 ∈ Y
n (resp. zn1 ∈ Z
n) and tries to decode (resp. to
infer) the transmitted message m ∈M. The decoder D sends
a Ack1/Nack1 feedback over a perfect channel that indicates
to the encoder, whether the first transmission was correctly
decoded or not.
If the encoder receives a Nackl−1 feedback after l − 1 ∈
{1, . . . , L} transmissions, then the message m ∈ M was
not correctly decoded yet. The encoder starts retransmitting
the message m ∈ M over transmission l ∈ {2, . . . , L}
with input sequence xnl ∈ X
n. The decoder D (resp.
eavesdropper E) tries to decode (resp. to infer) the trans-
mitted message m ∈ M from sequences of channel outputs
(yn1 , y
n
2 , . . . y
n
l ) ∈ Y
l×n (resp. (zn1 , z
n
2 , . . . z
n
l ) ∈ Z
l×n), where
Y l×n =
l︷ ︸︸ ︷
Yn × . . .× Yn is the l-time Cartesian self-product
of set Yn. If the maximal number of transmissions L is
attained, the encoder drops message m ∈ M and starts
sending the next messagem′ ∈M. The notation∆(X ) stands
for the set of the probability distributions P(X) over the set
X . We assume that the channel is memoryless with transi-
tion probability T (y, z|x, k) depending on a state parameter
k ∈ K, for example a fading coefficient. The state parameters
(k1, k2, . . . , kL) ∈ K
L stay constant during the transmission
of a block of n ∈ N symbols and are chosen at random with
i.i.d. probability distribution Pk ∈ ∆(K), from one block
to another. The state parameters (k1, k2, . . . , kL) ∈ KL are
observed by the decoder and the eavesdropper but not by the
encoder.
T1
T2
C D
M Mˆ
Xn1
Xn2
Y n1
Y n2
Zn1
Zn2 E
Ack/Nack k1k2
bb
k1
k2
Fig. 1. State dependent wiretap channels Ti(yi, zi|xi, ki), with i ∈ {1, 2}.
The second transmission starts if the encoder C receives a Nack feedback
from the legitimate decoder. The state parameters k1 ∈ K1 and k2 ∈ K2 are
chosen arbitrarily, stay constant during the transmission and are available only
at the legitimate decoder D and at the eavesdropper E .
At transmission l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, the state-dependent wiretap
channel is given by
T n(ynl , z
n
l |x
n
l , kl) =
n∏
i=1
T (yl(i), zl(i)|xl(i), kl), (1)
where xl(i) (resp. yl(i), zl(i)) denotes the i-th symbol of the
transmission block xl (resp. yl, zl) of length n. The channel
statistics are known by both encoder C and decoder D.
Definition 1 A HARQ-code cn ∈ C(n,R, L) with stochastic
encoder is a vector of encoding and decoding functions cn =(
(fl)l∈{1,...,L}, (gl)l∈{1,...,L}), defined for each transmission
l ∈ {1, . . . , L} as follows:
fl :M×X
(l−1)×n × {Ack,Nack}l−1 → ∆(Xn), (2)
gl : Y
l×n ×Kl −→M× {Ack,Nack}, (3)
where the rate R defines the cardinality |M| = 2nR of
the set of messages M and L is the maximal number of
transmissions. We denote by C(n,R, L), the set of HARQ-
codes with stochastic encoder.
Definition 2 For each vector of state parameters
(k1, . . . , kL) ∈ K
L, the error probability Pe and
the information leakage rate Le of the HARQ-code
cn ∈ C(n,R, L) are defined by:
Pe
(
cn
∣∣k1, . . . , kL) = P(M 6= Mˆ ∣∣∣ cn, k1, . . . , kL ),
Le
(
cn
∣∣k1, . . . , kL) = I
(
M ;Zn1 , . . . , Z
n
L
∣∣∣ cn, k1, . . . , kL )
n
.
The random variable Mˆ denotes the output message
of the legitimate decoder. Depending on the number of
transmissions l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, it is given by Mˆ =
gl(Y
n
1 , . . . , Y
n
l , k1, . . . , kl). A non-zero leakage rate means
that the eavesdropper can infer some information about the
message M , which is undesirable.
In [2], the authors prove the existence of a HARQ-code that
has small error probability and small information leakage rate
for a whole range of channel states (k1, . . . , kL) ∈ KL. The
coding scheme is based on Wyner’s coding for the wiretap
channel [27] and involves two parameters: the rate Rs ≥ 0,
which is called the “secrecy rate” and corresponds to the
4amount of secret information to be transmitted to the legitimate
decoder; and the rate R0 ≥ 0 which corresponds to the total
size of the codebook. The difference R0 − Rs ≥ 0 is called
the “dummy-message rate” and corresponds to the amount of
randomness that will be introduced in the codebook, in order
to confuse the eavesdropper.
Then, the conditions which are sufficient for the transmis-
sion to be reliable and secure, given by
R0 ≤
L∑
j∈1
I(Xj ;Yj |kj), (4)
R0 − Rs ≥
L∑
j∈1
I(Xj ;Zj |kj), (5)
define “the secure channel set” [2, Definition 2].
We note that (5) enforces a high value of the dummy-
message rate R0 − Rs which must guarantee the secrecy for
the maximal number of transmissions L. This, in turn, prevents
the first transmissions from being reliable, especially when the
number of possible transmissions L is large.
From this observation stems the main contribution of our
work which consists in splitting the dummy-message rate R0−
Rs over L different parameters denoted by R1,R2, . . . ,RL.
Splitting the dummy-message rate makes the first transmis-
sions more reliable, since the first dummy-message rates can
be smaller than R0 − Rs in [2]. The price is paid by a more
complex encoding/decoding; also the outage analysis is more
involved, since the L dummy-message rate parameters induce
L constraints, stated in equations (7) - (9) of Definition 3.
Definition 3 (Channel States) For a fixed number of trans-
missions l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, fixed parameters ε, R, R1, . . . ,RL
and a fixed probability distributions P⋆x ∈ ∆(X ), the set of
secure channel states, denoted by Sl(ε,R,R1, . . . ,RL,P
⋆
x ), is
the union of channel states (k1, . . . , kl) ∈ K
l that satisfy the
following set of equations:
R +
l∑
j=1
Rj ≤
l∑
j=1
I(Xj ;Yj |kj)− ε, (6)
l∑
j=1
Rj ≥
l∑
j=1
I(Xj ;Zj |kj)− ε, (7)
l−1∑
j=1
Rj ≥
l−1∑
j=1
I(Xj ;Zj |kj)− ε, (8)
...
R1 ≥ I(X1;Z1|k1)− ε. (9)
Equation (6) guarantees the correct decoding whereas equa-
tions (7) - (9) guarantee that the secrecy condition is satisfied
at each transmission l = {1, . . . , L}. We note that (6) - (9)
generalize equations of [2]. That is, using R2 = . . . = RL = 0,
R1 = R0 − Rs and R = Rs we obtain (4) and (5).3
These conditions are represented graphically in Fig. 2 for
L = 2 transmissions.
3Where, formally, ε should also be added as in (6) - (9).
I(X1;Y1|k1)
I(X1;Z1|k1)
I(X2;Y2|k2)
I(X2;Z2|k2)
b
b
b
b
b
b
R1
(6)
(7), (8)
R2
R1 + R2
R + R1 + R2
R + R1
Ack1Nack1
Fig. 2. Decoding and secrecy regions corresponding to the rates (R,R1,R2),
for L = 2 transmissions. The second transmission starts only if there
is a Nack1, hence we disregard the dashed region of Ack1. The green
upper region corresponds to the decoding constraint of equation (6) for the
mutual informations I(X1; Y1|k1) and I(X2; Y2|k2). The red lower region
corresponds to the secrecy constraints of equations (7), (8) for the mutual
informations I(X1;Z1|k1) and I(X2;Z2|k2).
We now prove the existence of a HARQ-code such that
the error probability Pe and the information leakage rate Le
converge to zero, for all tuples of channel states (k1, . . . , kL)
that belong to
⋃L
l=1 Sl(ε,R,R1, . . . ,RL,P
⋆
x ).
Theorem 4 (Compound Wiretap Channel) Fix the param-
eters R, R1, . . . ,RL and the input probability distribution
P⋆x ∈ ∆(X ). For all ε > 0, there exists a length n¯ ∈ N
such that for all n ≥ n¯, there exists a HARQ-code c⋆n ∈
C(n,R, L) that satisfies equations (10), for all channel states
(k1, . . . , kL) ∈
⋃L
l=1 Sl(ε,R,R1, . . . ,RL,P
⋆
x ).
Pe
(
c⋆n
∣∣∣∣k1, . . . , kL
)
≤ ε, Le
(
c⋆n
∣∣∣∣k1, . . . , kL
)
≤ ε. (10)
The proof of Theorem 4, stated in Appendix A, involves a
new multilevel coding argument that cannot be obtained as a
generalization of the coding scheme of [2, Appendix A].
In the rest of this article, the optimal sequence of HARQ-
codes c⋆ = (c⋆n)n≥1 is called “Adaptation-Secrecy-Rate-code”
(ASR-code) with parameters R,R1, . . . ,RL. The additional
degrees of freedom R2, . . . ,RL will be exploited to increase
the secrecy throughput and to lower the expected number of
transmissions and the connection and secrecy outages.
III. SECRECY THROUGHPUT, CONNECTION AND SECRECY
OUTAGES
A. Definitions
The channels under investigation are controlled by a state
parameter k ∈ K observed by the decoder and by the
eavesdropper but not by the encoder. We investigate the secure
transmission over this state-dependent wiretap channel based
on the outage approach. In this setting, the quality of the
channel of the eavesdropper is not known by the legitimate
5encoder and decoder. We introduce the events (Al)l∈{1,...,L}
corresponding to the correct decoding (11) and the events
(Bl)l∈{1,...,L} corresponding to the secret transmission (12).
Al =
{
R +
l∑
j∈1
Rj ≤
l∑
j∈1
I(Xj ;Yj |kj)
}
, (11)
Bl =
{ l∑
j∈1
Rj ≥
l∑
j∈1
I(Xj ;Zj|kj)
}
, (12)
Definition 5 The connection outage probability Pco and se-
crecy outage probability Pso are defined by:
Pco = P
( L⋂
l=1
Acl
)
, Pso = P
( L⋃
l=1
Bcl
)
. (13)
A connection outage occurs if for all transmissions l ∈
{1, . . . , L}, the decoding event Al is not satisfied. A secrecy
outage occurs if there exists a transmission l ∈ {1, . . . , L},
for which the secrecy event Bl is not satisfied.
Remark 6 Notation Ac stands for the complementary of A.
Letting the parameters R2 = . . . = RL = 0, this implies that
Al−1 ⊂ Al, Bl ⊂ Bl−1 and the definitions of Pco and Pso
reduce to those shown in [2, Eqs. (21), (22)].
Proposition 7 Suppose that the random events (Bl)l∈{1,...,L}
are independent of the random events (Al)l∈{1,...,L}. The
secrecy outage probability writes:
Pso = 1−
L−1∑
j=2
P
( j⋂
i=1
Bi
)
·
(
P
( j−1⋂
i=1
A
c
i
)
− P
( j⋂
i=1
A
c
i
))
− P
(
B1
)
· P
(
A1
)
− P
( L⋂
i=1
Bi
)
· P
(L−1⋂
i=1
A
c
i
)
. (14)
Proof of Prop. 7 is stated in App. B. This formulation will be
used for discrete channels in Sec. III-B and Gaussian channel
in Sec. IV. We denote by L ∈ {1, . . . , L}, the random number
of transmissions that depends on channel states parameters
(k1, . . . , kL) and rate parameters (R,R1, . . . ,RL).
P(L = 1) = P
(
A1
)
, (15)
P(L = l) = P
( l−1⋂
j=1
Acj ∩Al
)
, ∀l ∈ {2, . . . , L− 1}
= P
( l−1⋂
j=1
Acj
)
− P
( l⋂
j=1
Acj
)
, (16)
P(L = L) = P
(L−1⋂
j=1
Acj
)
. (17)
The expected number of transmissions E
[
L
]
is given by:
E
[
L
]
=
L∑
l=1
l · P(L = l) = 1 +
L−1∑
l=1
P
( l⋂
j=1
Acj
)
. (18)
Since the number of transmissions L is a random variable,
the expected number of bits correctly decoded is given by the
Renewal-Reward Theorem as in [51], [5].
Definition 8 The secrecy throughput η is defined as the ex-
pected number of bits correctly decoded by the legitimate
decoder per channel use and can be obtained from the
renewal-reward approach
η = max
R,
R1,...RL,
E[R]
E[L]
= max
R,
R1,...RL,
R · (1− Pco)
1 +
∑L−1
l=1 P
(⋂l
j=1A
c
j
) ,
u.c.
{
Pco ≤ ξc,
Pso ≤ ξs.
(19)
The maximum is taken over the parameters R,R1, . . . ,RL,
such that the connection outage probability and the secrecy
outage probability are lower than ξc and ξs, which are the
constraints defined according to the requirements on the se-
crecy and reliability.
B. Example: Discrete Channel States
To illustrate the definitions we introduced, we consider the
scenario represented by Fig. 3, in which the channel states of
the legitimate decoder and of the eavesdropper are binary and
uniformly distributed over {ky, k′y} and {kz, k′z}. We define
the operating point as ξc = 0.25 and ξs = 0.125, and assume
the maximum number of transmissions is L = 2. We investi-
First Transmission
I(X1;Z1|k
z
1
) = 2
I(X1;Z1|k
′z
1
) = 3.5
C
C
E
E
P(kz
1
) = P(k′z
1
) = 1/2
I(X1;Y1|k
y
1
) = 4
I(X1;Y1|k
′y
1
) = 5
C
C
D
D
P(ky
1
) = P(k′y
1
) = 1/2
Second Transmission
I(X2;Z2|k
z
2
) = 2
I(X2;Z2|k
′z
2
) = 3.5
C
C
E
E
P(kz
2
) = P(k′z
2
) = 1/2
I(X2;Y2|k
y
2
) = 4
I(X2; Y2|k
′y
2
]) = 5
C
C
D
D
P(ky
2
) = P(k′y
2
) = 1/2
Fig. 3. In both transmissions, the capacity of the channel to the legitimate
decoder takes two possible values {4, 5} with probability (1/2, 1/2) and the
capacity of the channel to the eavesdropper takes two possible values {2, 3.5}
with probability (1/2, 1/2).
gate the secrecy throughput of the ASR-code whose existence
is stated in Theorem 4 and we compare its performance to the
protocols shown in [2] and in [44].
• The secure HARQ protocol of [2] is a particular case of
the ASR-code in which the dummy-message rate R2 = 0 is
zero. As depicted on fig. 4, after L = 2 transmissions, the
decoding is correct if:
R + R1 ≤ I(X1;Y1|k1) + I(X2;Y2|k2), (20)
and the transmission is secret if:
R1 ≥ I(X1;Y1|k1) + I(X2;Y2|k2). (21)
6I(X1;Y1|k1)
I(X1;Z1|k1)
I(X2;Y2|k2)
I(X2;Z2|k2)
b b
b
b
R1
(D)
(S)
R1
R + R1
R + R1
Ack1Nack1
Fig. 4. Regions of correct decoding (D) and secret transmission (S) of [2],
corresponding to equations (20) and (21).
• The S-HARQ protocol of [44, Sec. V] involves multiple
dummy-message rates (R1,R2). As depicted on fig. 5, after
L = 2 transmissions, the decoding is correct if:
R ≤ max
(
I(X1;Y1|k1)− R1, 0
)
+ max
(
I(X2;Y2|k2)− R2, 0
)
, (22)
and the transmission is secret if:
R1 ≥ I(X1;Y1|k1), R2 ≥ I(X2;Y2|k2). (23)
Fig. 2, 4 and 5 show that the decoding and the secrecy
regions are different for the ASR-code and for the protocols
of [2] and [44].
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I(X1;Z1|k1)
I(X2;Y2|k2)
I(X2;Z2|k2)
b
b
b
b
b
R1
R2
R + R2
R + R1 + R2
R + R1
Ack1Nack1
(D)
(S)
Fig. 5. Regions of correct decoding (D) and secret transmission (S) of [44],
corresponding to equations (22) and (23).
Fig. 6 compares the secrecy throughput of ASR-code, and
of the protocols of [2] and [44]; we observe the following
• The ASR-code outperforms both protocols [2] and [44]
for the secrecy rate R = 1.5, dummy message rates
(R1,R2) = (3.5, 2) and outage probabilities (Pco,Pso) =
(0, 0.125).
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Fig. 6. Secrecy throughput for L = 2 possible transmissions and the
constraints ξc = 0.25, ξs = 0.125.
• For the protocol of [2], the optimal dummy-message rate
R
[2]
1 = 7 corresponding to L = 2 transmissions is
high and prevents the first transmission to be decoded
correctly.
• For the protocol of [44], the optimal second dummy-
message rate R [44]2 = 3.5 is higher than R2 = 2 for ASR-
code. Hence, when the secrecy rate exceeds R ≥ 1.5, the
connection outage probability increases to Pco = 0.25
and reduces the secrecy throughput.
• In the example we show, the ASR-code provides more
than 33% of increase compared to the protocols of [2]
and [44]. However, we hasten to say that the improve-
ment depends on the adopted distribution of the channel
gains. In particular, if the values of the channels to the
eavesdropper are replaced by {2, 3} (instead of {2, 3.5}),
the protocol of [44] provides the same secrecy throughput
η = 1.333 as the ASR-code, whereas the protocol of
[2] provides a lower secrecy throughput of η = 1.125.
Therefore, while we are sure our approach outperforms
[2], the direct comparison with [44] is not obvious, as also
noted in [44, pp.1714]. Despite this cautionary statement,
we did not find any example where the throughput of
[44] is larger than the one offered by the ASR-code we
propose.
IV. RAYLEIGH BLOCK-FADING GAUSSIAN WIRETAP
CHANNELS
A. Channel Model
We consider the Gaussian wiretap channel with Rayleigh
block-fading represented in Fig. 7 and defined as
Y = hd ·X +Nd, Z = he ·X +Ne. (24)
where Nd and Ne are i.i.d. zero-mean, unit-variance Gaussian
variables. In this work, we consider the canonical model of
independent block-fading channels. The applicability of the
ASR-code in the case of correlated fading [52]–[55] requires
7further study but goes beyond the scope of this work which
focuses on the code design problem.
We assume a normalized power constraint on the channel
input E
[
|X |2
]
≤ P = 1. The state parameters k = (hd, he) ∈
M
C D
Mˆ
E
X Y
Z
hd Nd
he Ne
Fig. 7. Gaussian wiretap channel with Rayleigh block-fading (hd, he).
K are fading coefficients, distributed i.i.d. from one block
to another with Rayleigh probability distribution. Since the
mean of noise and power are normalized to 1, we introduce
the notation SNRd = |hd|2 and SNRe = |he|2. The mean
SNRs are denoted by γd = E[SNRd] = E
[
|hd|
2
]
and
γe = E[SNRe] = E
[
|he|
2
]
. For x ≥ 0, the probability density
function f(x) and the cumulative distribution function F (x)
of the SNRs are defined by
f(x) =
1
γ
· e−
x
γ , F (x) = 1− e−
x
γ . (25)
so the mutual informations write as
I(X ;Y |hd) = log(1 + SNRd), (26)
I(X ;Z|he) = log(1 + SNRe). (27)
and depend on the random fading coefficients k = (hd, he) ∈
K.
The constraints ξc and ξs are not always compatible since
the outage constraints Pco ≤ ξc and Pso ≤ ξs may not be
satisfied simultaneously. We characterize the trade-off between
connection outage probability and secrecy outage probability
when only one transmission is allowed, i.e., L = 1.
Theorem 9 Consider the case of L = 1 transmission.
• The constraints ξc and ξs are compatible if and only if
ξs ≥
(
1− ξc
) γd
γe
⇐⇒
(
ξs
)γe
−
(
1− ξc
)γd
≥ 0. (28)
• For a fixed secrecy rate R ≥ 0, the contraints ξc and ξs are
compatible if and only if
R ≤ log2
(
1− γd · ln(1− ξc)
1− γe · ln(ξs)
)
. (29)
The proof of Theorem 9 is stated in App. C. Equation (28)
emphasizes that the trade-off between the connection and the
secrecy outage probability only depends on the ratio γd/γe,
i.e., the difference γd−γe in [dB]. Fig. 8 represents the secrecy
throughput for L = 1 transmission depending on the rate
parameter R, for different constraints (ξc, ξs). The shape of the
curve depends on the secrecy outage constraint Pso ≤ ξs. The
connection outage constraint Pco ≤ ξc truncates the secrecy
throughput at the dashed lines.
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Fig. 8. Secrecy throughput depending on the secrecy rate R ≥ 0, for
different secrecy constraints ξs ∈
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}
and a single L = 1
transmission. Vertical dashed lines represents the maximal secrecy rate R
corresponding to the constraint ξc = 0.75.
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Fig. 9. Trade-off between the connection Pco and secrecy Pso outage
probability, for zero rate R = 0 and number of transmissions L ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8}.
B. Multiple Transmissions
We propose a numerical optimization of the secrecy
throughput with respect to the rate parameters for the case
of L ≥ 2 multiple transmissions.
Since our objective is to demonstrate that the ASR-code out-
performs the HARQ-code of [2], we show a simple example
where the dummy-message rate parameters R2 = R3 = . . . =
RL are equal after the second transmission. This makes the
presentation easier and avoids the tedious optimization which
depends only on three parameters: (R,R1,R2).
For Rayleigh fading channels the protocol of [2] outper-
forms the one proposed in [44] as can be seen in [44, Fig. 6,
8Fig. 7, Fig. 8]. Thus, we only need to compare the performance
of the ASR-code we proposed with the protocol of [2]. The
main difference is that the latter uses two parameters (R,R1),
while the ASR-code uses three rates (R,R1,R2).
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Fig. 10. Secrecy throughput depending on the secrecy rate R, under different
pairs of constraints (ξc, ξs) ∈
{
(1, 10−2), (1, 10−4), (1, 10−6)
}
. For each
setting, the ASR-code outperforms the protocol of [2].
Trade-off between connection and secrecy outage prob-
abilities.
As mentioned in Sec IV-A, the constraints ξc and ξs are not
always compatible. Fig. 9 represents the trade-off between the
connection Pco and the secrecy Pso outages, depending on
the maximal number of transmissions L ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8}, for
R = 0. For each setting, the trade-off for the protocol of [2] is
more restrictive than for the ASR-code. Splitting the dummy-
message rate over multiple transmissions, i.e., with R2 > 0,
provides a small improvement for this trade-off. For a given
pair of constraints (ξc, ξs), there exists a minimal number of
transmissions L such that the connection and secrecy outage
probabilities Pco ≤ ξc and Pso ≤ ξs satisfy the constraints.
Range of dummy-message rate R1 ∈ [R
min
1 ,R
max
1 ].
The minimal rate R1 should guarantee that during the
first transmission, the equation P
(
I(X1;Z1|k1) ≥ R1
)
=
ξs is satisfied with equality. If the inequality was strict
P
(
I(X1;Z1|k1) ≥ R1
)
< ξs, then it would be possible to
decrease the rate parameter R1 in order to increase the secrecy
rate R and the corresponding throughput. The minimal rate
R
min
1 ≤ R1 is defined by:
R
min
1 = log2
(
1− γe · log2(ξs)
)
. (30)
The maximal rate R1 should guarantee that the secrecy
outage probability for L possible transmissions, is equal to ξs.
A larger dummy-message rate R1 would be a waste of trans-
mission resources. This induces a maximal rate Rmax1 ≥ R1,
defined by:
R
max
1 s.t. P
( L∑
j∈1
I(Xj ;Zj|kj) ≥ R
max
1
)
= ξs. (31)
The dummy-message rate Rmax1 is optimal for the protocol of
[2], i.e., where second rate R2 = 0 is zero.
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Fig. 11. Optimal rates (R⋆1,R
⋆
2) for the ASR-code and R
max
1 for the protocol
of [2], depending on the secrecy rate R under different pairs of constraints
(ξc, ξs) ∈
{
(1, 10−2), (1, 10−4), (1, 10−6)
}
.
Optimization of dummy-message rates (R1,R2).
We fixe the secrecy rate R ≥ 0 and for each rate Rmin1 ≤ R1 ≤
R
max
1 , we find R
⋆
2(R1) such that the secrecy outage constraint
Pso = ξs is satisfied with equality. Then, we optimize the
secrecy throughput regarding the pair of rates
(
R1,R
⋆
2(R1)
)
and the secrecy rate R.
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Fig. 12. connection and secrecy outage probabilities for the ASR-code and
for the protocol of [2], depending on the secrecy rate R under different pairs
of constraints (ξc, ξs) ∈
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(1, 10−2), (1, 10−4), (1, 10−6)
}
.
9Constraints (ξc, ξs) (1, 10−6) (1, 10−4) (1, 10−2) (10−2, 10−2)
Maximal secrecy throughput η with Rmax1 , R2 = 0 0.55 0.78 1.22 1.00
Maximal secrecy throughput η with (R⋆1,R
⋆
2) 0.60 0.86 1.32 1.11
Increase of secrecy throughput 9% 10% 8% 11%
E
[
L
]
with Rmax1 , R2 = 0 7.76 7.57 7.20 5.94
E
[
L
]
with (R⋆1,R
⋆
2) 6.92 6.53 6.14 5.36
Reduction of exp. number of transmissions −10% −14% −15% −10%
Fig. 13. Maximal secrecy throughput η corresponding to Fig. 10 and expected number of transmissions E
[
L
]
. For each pair of outage parameters (ξc, ξs),
the ASR-code provides a higher secrecy throughput and a lower expected number of transmissions, compared to the protocol of [2].
Numerical Results
Figure 10 compares the secrecy throughput for the ASR-code
and for the protocol of [2]. These two curves are drawn
depending the secrecy rate R ≥ 0, by considering four pairs
of constraints:
(ξc, ξs) ∈
{
(1, 10−2), (1, 10−4), (1, 10−6), (10−2, 10−2)
}
.
• As mentioned in Fig. 13, splitting the dummy-message
rate using (R1,R2) improves the secrecy throughput by
more than 8%, compared to the approach of [2], with
only one parameter Rmax1 , i.e., with R2 = 0.
• Tightening the secrecy constraint ξs, reduces the secrecy
throughput.
• As mentioned for one transmission in Sec. IV-A, the
connection outage constraint ξc induces a truncation of
the secrecy throughput. This is illustrated by the curves
corresponding to: (ξc, ξs) ∈
{
(1, 10−2), (10−2, 10−2)
}
.
• The optimal rates (R⋆1,R
⋆
2) for the ASR-code are pre-
sented in Fig. 11. As expected, the first parameter R⋆1 <
R
max
1 is lower for the ASR-code than for the protocol
of [2]. Therefore, the first transmissions are more likely
to be decoded correctly and this increases the secrecy
throughput.
• The connection outage probability Pco corresponding to
the optimal parameters (R,R⋆1,R
⋆
2) of the ASR-code are
presented in Fig. 12. For (ξc, ξs) = (1, 10−2), the secrecy
rate R = 6 induces a connection outage probability close
to Pco ≃ 10−2 that corresponds to the truncation of the
secrecy throughput for R ≥ 6, on Fig. 10. The connection
outage probability is larger for the ASR-code than for the
protocol of [2] because the total dummy-message rate
R1 + (L− 1) ·R2 > R
max
1 is greater. However, this does
not prevent the secrecy throughput of the ASR-code to
be greater than for the protocol of [2].
• The expected number of transmissions E
[
L
]
is
represented in Fig. 14. In Fig. 13, the secrecy
throughput and the expected number of transmissions
E
[
L
]
are provided for the constraints: (ξc, ξs) ∈{
(1, 10−2), (1, 10−4), (1, 10−6), (10−2, 10−2)
}
.
• Compared to the protocol of [2], the ASR-code increases
the secrecy throughput η by more than 8% and reduces
the expected number of transmissions E
[
L
]
by more than
10%.
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Fig. 14. Expected number of transmissions E
[
L
]
for the ASR-code and for
the protocol of [2], depending on the secrecy rate R with different pairs of
constraints (ξc, ξs) ∈
{
(1, 10−2), (1, 10−4), (1, 10−6)
}
.
V. CONCLUSION
We investigate secure HARQ protocols for state-dependent
channels where the encoder only knows the statistics of the
channel state. In this case, the reliability and security are
defined in a probabilistic sense and there is a trade-off between
the constraints we can impose on these two criteria.
The presence of multiple transmissions rounds in HARQ
offers new dimensions which we exploit in the design of the
code to ensure secrecy and reliability. This was done in the
literature, using a unique dummy-message. Our work follows
this idea but, unlike previous works, we design a new code
tailored for HARQ protocol, by splitting the dummy-message
rate over several rate parameters. These additional degrees of
freedom improve the matching between the dummy-message
rates and the realization of the eavesdropper channel. We
evaluate the performance in terms of secrecy outage probabil-
ity, connection outage probability and secrecy throughput. For
Rayleigh fading channel, the splitting of the dummy-message
rate provides higher secrecy throughput and lower expected
duration/average delay.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
We prove the Theorem 4 considering L = 2 transmissions.
We provide a coding scheme that is reliable and secure for all
pair of channel states (k1, k2) that satisfy equation (32).
(k1, k2) ∈ S
c
1(ε,R,R1,P
⋆
x ) ∩ S2(ε,R,R1,R2,P
⋆
x ). (32)
The first transmission is not reliable, the encoder receives
a NACK1 feedback and starts a second transmission. More
precisely, the channel states (k1, k2) satisfy equations (33),
(34), (35), (36).
R + R1 + R2 ≤ I(X1;Y1|k1) + I(X2;Y2|k2)− 8ε,(33)
R + R1 > I(X1;Y1|k1)− 4ε, (34)
R1 + R2 ≥ I(X1;Z1|k1) + I(X2;Z2|k2)− 4ε,(35)
R1 ≥ I(X1;Z1|k1)− 4ε. (36)
Equations (33), (35), (36) correspond to the definition of the
set of channel states S2(ε,R,R1,R2,P⋆x ) and equation (34)
corresponds to the NACK1 feedback, i.e., the first transmission
failed k1 /∈ Sc1(ε,R,R1,P
⋆
x ). Combining (33) and (34), it
induces equation (37) that will be used in the following.
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y2|k2)− 4ε. (37)
Fig. 2 shows that equation (37) is a direct consequence
of equation (33), since the second transmission starts
only when there is a Nack1 feedback. Let the length
of the first transmission bloc n¯ ∈ N be larger than
(n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6, n7, n8, n9) given by equations (39),
(40), (41), (42), (62), (63), (64), (65) and (66). We prove that
there exists a HARQ-code c⋆ ∈ C(n,R, L) with stochastic
encoder such that the error probability and the information
leakage rate satisfy equation (38), for all channel states
(k1, k2) ∈ S
c
1(ε,R,R1,P
⋆
x ) ∩ S2(ε,R,R1,R2,P
⋆
x ),
Pe
(
c⋆
∣∣∣∣k1, k2
)
≤ ε′, Le
(
c⋆
∣∣∣∣k1, k2
)
≤ ε′, (38)
with ε′ = ε · (13 + 20 log2 |X |).
Using similar arguments, the HARQ-code with stochastic
encoder c⋆ ∈ C(n,R, L) can be extended to the case of L
transmissions. The coding scheme is reliable and secure for all
channel states (k1, . . . , kL) ∈
⋃L
l=1 Sl(ε,R,R1, . . . ,RL,P
⋆
x )
stated in definition 3.
A. Random HARQ-Code
We consider a random HARQ-code C ∈ C(n,R, L) with
stochastic encoder, represented by figure 15 for L = 2
transmissions and defined as follows:
• Random codebook for the first transmission. Generate
|M ×M1| = 2
n(R+R1) sequences Xn1 ∈ X drawn from
the probability distribution P⋆×nx . Randomly bin them
into |M| = 2nR bins denoted by m ∈ M, each of them
containing |M1| = 2nR1 sequences Xn1 ∈ X
n indexed
by the parameter w1 ∈ M1.
• Encoding for the first transmission. The encoder observes
the realization of the message m ∈ M. It chooses at
random the parameter w1 ∈ M1 using the uniform
b
b
b
b
Xn1 (m,w1) ∼ P
⋆×n
x
m
w1
|M| = 2nR
|M×M1| = 2n(R+R1)
|M1| = 2nR1✛
b b b
b
b
b
b b b
b
Xn2 (m,w1, w2) ∼ P
⋆n
x
m
w1w2
|M| = 2nR
|M×M1 ×M2| = 2n(R+R1+R2)
|M1 ×M2| = 2n(R1+R2)■
|M2| = 2nR2
|M1| = 2nR1✛
Fig. 15. Multilevel random coding scheme C ∈ C(n,R, L) stated in section
A-A for L = 2 transmissions. The parameters n ∈ N, ∈ R+, R ∈ R+,
R1 ∈ R+, R2 ∈ R+ determine the cardinalities of the set of messages |M| =
2nR , the cardinality of the bins |M1| = 2nR1 and the number of sub-bins
|M2| = 2nR2 . The random codewords Xn1 (m,w1) and X
n
2 (m,w1, w2)
are generated with i.i.d. probability distribution P⋆×nx .
probability distribution and sends the sequence of channel
inputs xn1 (m,w1) through the channel T1.
• First feedback from the decoder. The decoder observes
the realization of the channel state k1 ∈ K1 and sends
to the encoder the feedback "Ack1" if it can decode the
message after the first transmission (i.e. equation (34) is
not satisfied). It sends the feedback "Nack1" if it can not
decode after the first transmission (i.e. equation (34) is
satisfied).
• Decoding fonction for "Ack1". The decoder observes the
state parameter k1 ∈ K1 and finds the pair of indices
(m,w1) ∈M×M1 such that xn1 (m,w1) ∈ A
⋆n
ε (y
n
1 |k1)
is jointly typical with the sequence of channel outputs.
Its returns the index m ∈ M of the transmitted message.
• Random codebook for the second transmission. Generate
|M ×M1 ×M2| = 2
n(R+R1+R2) sequences Xn2 ∈ X
n
drawn from the probability distribution P⋆×nx . Randomly
bin them into |M| = 2nR bins denoted by m ∈M, each
of them containing |M1 ×M2| = 2n(R1+R2) sequences
Xn2 ∈ X
n indexed by a pair of parameters (w1, w2) ∈
M1 ×M2. Each bin m ∈ M is divided into |M2| =
2nR2 sub-bins containing |M1| = 2nR1 sequences Xn2 ∈
Xn. We denote by w2 ∈ M2 the index of the sub-bins
and by w1 ∈M1 the index of the sequence of symboles
Xn2 (m,w1, w2) ∈ X
n.
• Encoding for the second transmission. If the encoder
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receives a "Nack1" feedback, the second transmission
starts. Encoder chooses at random the parameter w2 ∈
M2 using the uniform probability distribution and sends
the sequence of channel inputs xn2 (m,w1, w2).
• Second feedback from the decoder. The decoder observes
the realization of the channel state (k1, k2) ∈ K1 × K2
and sends to the encoder the feedback "Ack2" if it
can decode (i.e. equation (33) is satisfied). It sends the
feedback "Nack2" if it can not decode (i.e. equation (33)
is satisfied).
• Decoding function for "Ack2". The decoder observes
the state parameters (k1, k2) ∈ K1 × K2 and finds the
triple of indices (m,w1, w2) ∈ M ×M1 ×M2 such
that xn1 (m,w1) ∈ A
⋆n
ε (y
n
1 |k1) is jointly typical with the
sequence of outputs of the first channel T1 and such that
xn2 (m,w1, w2) ∈ A
⋆n
ε (y
n
2 |k2) is jointly typical with the
sequence of outputs of the second channel T2. Its returns
the index m ∈M of the transmitted message.
• Larger number of transmissions L > 2. The same pro-
cedure involving random codebook, encoding, feedbacks
and decoding is repeated for L > 2 transmissions.
• An error is declared when the sequences (xn1 , y
n
1 , z
n
1 ) /∈
A⋆nε (Q1|k1) or (x
n
2 , y
n
2 , z
n
2 ) /∈ A
⋆n
ε (Q2|k2) are not
jointly typical for the probability distributions Q1 =
P⋆x × T1 ∈ ∆(X × Y1 × Z1) and Q2 = P
⋆
x × T2 ∈
∆(X × Y2 ×Z2).
Remark 10 The parameter n ∈ N is the length of the
transmission block, |M| = 2nR is the cardinality of the
set of messages M, |M1| = 2nR1 is the cardinality of the
set of dummy-messages M1 for the first transmission and
|M2| = 2
nR2 is the cardinality of the set of dummy-messages
M2 for the second transmission. We denote by P⋆x ∈ ∆(X )
the probability distribution of the sequences of channel inputs.
B. Expected error probability
We upper bound the expected error probability for
fixed messages (m,w1, w2) and channel states (k1, k2) ∈
Sc1(ε,R,R1,P
⋆
x ) ∩ S2(ε,R,R1,R2,P
⋆
x ).
Ec
[
P
({
(xn1 , y
n
1 , z
n
1 ) /∈ A
⋆n
ε (Q1|k1)
}
∪
{
(xn2 , y
n
2 , z
n
2 ) /∈ A
⋆n
ε (Q2|k2)
})]
≤ ε, (39)
Ec
[
P
({
∃(m′, w′1, w
′
2) 6= (m,w1, w2), s.t.
{xn1 (m
′, w′1) ∈ A
⋆n
ε (y
n
1 |k1)}
∩{xn2 (m
′, w′1, w
′
2) ∈ A
⋆n
ε (y
n
2 |k2)}
})]
≤ ε, (40)
Ec
[
P
({
∃(m′, w′1) 6= (m,w1), s.t.
{xn1 (m
′, w′1) ∈ A
⋆n
ε (y
n
1 |k1)}
∩{xn2 (m
′, w′1, w2) ∈ A
⋆n
ε (y
n
2 |k2)}
})]
≤ ε, (41)
Ec
[
P
({
∃w′2 6= w2, s.t.
xn2 (m,w1, w
′
2) ∈ A
⋆n
ε (y
n
2 |k2)
})]
≤ ε. (42)
(39) comes from the typical sequences [56, pp. 26].
(40) comes from (33) and [56, pp. 46, Packing Lemma] since
the codewords (Xn1 (m
′, w′1), X
n
2 (m
′, w′1, w
′
2)) are indepen-
dent of (Xn1 (m,w1), X
n
2 (m,w1, w2)).
(41) comes from (33) and [56, pp. 46, Packing Lemma].
(42) comes from (37) and [56, pp. 46, Packing Lemma].
This provides an upper bound on:
Ec
[
Pe
(
C
∣∣∣∣k1, k2
)]
≤ 4ε. (43)
C. Expected information leakage rate
We provide an upper bound on the expected information
leakage rate that is valid for all channel states (k1, k2) ∈
Sc1(ε,R,R1,P
⋆
x ) ∩ S2(ε,R,R1,R2,P
⋆
x ). To this purpose, we
introduce four auxiliary random variables V1, J1, V2 and
J2 that belong to the sets MV1 , MJ1 , MV2 and MJ2 with
cardinality |MV1 | = 2
nRV1 , |MJ1 | = 2
nRJ1 , |MV2 | = 2
nRV2
and |MJ2 | = 2
nRJ2 given by:
RV1 = I(X1;Z1|k1) + I(X2;Z2|k2)
− min
(
I(X2;Z2|k2),R2
)
− 4ε, (44)
RV2 = min
(
I(X2;Z2|k2),R2
)
− 4ε, (45)
RJ1 = R1 − RV1
= min
(
R1 − I(X1;Z1|k1) + 4ε,R1 + R2
− I(X1;Z1|k1)− I(X2;Z2|k2) + 4ε
)
, (46)
RJ2 = R2 − RV2
= max
(
R2 − I(X2;Z2|k2), 0
)
+ 4ε. (47)
The idea of this proof is to adapt the size of the set of
dummy-messages to the realizations of the mutual informa-
tions I(X1;Z1|k1) and I(X2;Z2|k2). The parameters RV1 ,
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RV2 and RJ2 are positive. Equations (35) and (36) guarantees
that parameter RJ1 is positive for all channel states (k1, k2) ∈
Sc1(ε,R,R1,P
⋆
x ) ∩ S2(ε,R,R1,R2,P
⋆
x ). In this section, each
bin m ∈ M is re-organized as follows:
• First, we divide each sub-bin w2 ∈ M2 of size 2nR1 into
2nRJ1 sub-sub-bins of size 2nRV1 .
• Second, we concatenate the sub-bins w2 ∈M2 into 2nRJ2
super-sub-bins containing 2nRV2 sub-bins w2 ∈ M2.
This analysis does not modify the random code C but it
allows to provide an upper bound over the information leakage
rate. The parameters W1 and W2 correspond to the pairs of
auxiliary random variablesW1 = (V1, J1) andW2 = (V2, J2).
n · Ec
[
Le
(
C
∣∣∣∣k1, k2
)]
= I(M,W1,W2;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 |C, k1, k2) (48)
− H(W1,W2|M,C, k1, k2) (49)
+ H(W1,W2|M,C,Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , k1, k2). (50)
• The first term (48) satisfies:
I(M,W1,W2, C;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 |k1, k2)
≤ I(Xn1 , X
n
2 ;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 |k1, k2) (51)
= n · (I(X1;Z1|k1) + ·I(X2;Z2|k2)). (52)
(51) comes from the Markov chain (C,M,W1,W2) −
−
(Xn1 , X
n
2 ) −
− (Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 ) for all channel states (k1, k2) ∈
Sc1(ε,R,R1,P
⋆
x ) ∩ S2(ε,R,R1,R2,P
⋆
x ).
(52) comes from the independent generation of the sequences
Xn1 and X
n
2 with i.i.d. probability distributions P
⋆
x .
• The second term (49) satisfies:
H(W1,W2|M,C, k1, k2) = n · (R1 + R2). (53)
(53) comes from the fact that the random variable W1 and
W2 are drawn independently of (M,C, k1, k2) and uniformly
distributed over the sets M1, M2 of cardinality 2nR1 , 2nR2 .
• The third term (50) satisfies:
H(W1,W2|M,C,Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , k1, k2)
= H(V1, J1, V2, J2|M,C,Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , k1, k2) (54)
= H(J1, J2|M,C,Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , k1, k2)
+ H(V1, V2|J1, J2,M,C, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , k1, k2) (55)
≤ n · (RJ1 + RJ2)
+ H(V1, V2|J1, J2,M,C, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , k1, k2) (56)
= n ·
(
R1 + R2 − I(X1;Z1|k1)− I(X2;Z2|k2) + 8ε
)
+ H(V1, V2|J1, J2,M,C, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , k1, k2) (57)
≤ n ·
(
R1 + R2 − I(X1;Z1|k1)− I(X2;Z2|k2)
+ ε ·
(
9 + 20 log2 |X |
))
. (58)
(54) comes from replacing indices (w1, w2) ∈ M1 ×M2 by
auxiliary indices (v1, j1, v2, j2) ∈MV1×MJ1×MV2×MJ2 .
(55) and (56) come from the properties of the entropy function
and the cardinalities |MJ1 | = 2
nRJ1 and |MJ2 | = 2
nRJ2 .
(57) comes from the equations (46) and (47),
satisfied for all channel states (k1, k2) ∈
Sc1(ε,R,R1,P
⋆
x ) ∩ S2(ε,R,R1,R2,P
⋆
x ) and the equation:
max(a, b) + min(a, b) = a+ b.
(58) comes from Lemma 1, that is based on Fano’s inequality.
Equations (52), (53) and (58) provide an upper bound on:
Ec
[
Le
(
C
∣∣∣k1, k2)] ≤ ε · (9 + 20 log2 |X |). (59)
This analysis can be extended to the case of L > 2 transmis-
sions by introducing the random variables RVL and RJL .
Lemma 1 Fano’s inequality provides the upper bound:
H(V1, V2|J1, J2,M,C, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , k1, k2)
≤ n ·
(
ε+ 20ε · log2 |X |
)
. (60)
Proof. [Lemma 1] Suppose that the eavesdropper implements
the decoding ge defined by equation (61) as follows:
• Decoding of the eavesdropper ge takes the sequence of
channel outputs Zn1 ∈ Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 ∈ Z
n
2 , the message M ∈
M, the indices J1 ∈ MJ1 , J2 ∈ MJ2 and the HARQ-
code C ∈ C(n,R, L) and returns the indices V1 ∈ MV1 ,
V2 ∈ MV2 and the sequences X
n
1 (M,V1, J1) ∈ X
n and
Xn2 (M,V1, J1, V2, J2) ∈ X
n that are jointly typical with
Zn1 ∈ Z
n
1 and Z
n
2 ∈ Z
n
2 .
ge : Z
n
1 ×Z
n
2 ×M×MJ1 ×MJ2
×K1 ×K2 × C(n,R,RW,RL,P
⋆
x1
,P⋆x2)
−→ Xn ×Xn ×MV1 ×MV2 . (61)
An error occurs if this decoding function ge returns
sequences of inputs and indices (xˆn1 , xˆ
n
2 , vˆ1, vˆ2) 6=
ge(z
n
1 , z
n
2 ,m, j1, j2, c, k1, k2) that are different from the
original tuple (xn1 , x
n
2 , v1, v2). We provide an upper bound
over the expected error probability of this decoding function
ge.
Ec
[
P
({
(xn1 , z
n
1 ) /∈ A
⋆n
ε (Q1|k1)
}
∪
{
(xn2 , z
n
2 ) /∈ A
⋆n
ε (Q2|k2)
})]
≤ ε, (62)
Ec
[
P
({
∃(v′1, v
′
2) 6= (v1, v2), s.t.
{xn1 (m, v
′
1, j1) ∈ A
⋆n
ε (z
n
1 |k1)}
∩{xn2 (m, v
′
1, j1, v
′
2, j2) ∈ A
⋆n
ε (z
n
2 |k2)}
})]
≤ ε, (63)
Ec
[
P
({
∃v′1 6= v1, s.t.
{xn1 (m, v
′
1, j1) ∈ A
⋆n
ε (z
n
1 |k1)}
∩{xn2 (m, v
′
1, j1, v2, j2) ∈ A
⋆n
ε (z
n
2 |k2)}
})]
≤ ε, (64)
Ec
[
P
({
∃v′2 6= v2, s.t.
xn2 (m, v1, j1, v
′
2, j2) ∈ A
⋆n
ε (z
n
2 |k2)
})]
≤ ε. (65)
(62) comes from properties of typical sequences [56, pp. 26].
(63) comes from (44), (45) and [56, pp. 46, Packing Lemma].
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(64) comes from (44) and [56, pp. 46, Packing Lemma].
(65) comes from (45) and [56, pp. 46, Packing Lemma].
Equations (62), (63), (64) and (65) prove that the expected
probability of this decoding ge is upper bounded by 4ε.
H(V1, V2|M,J1, J2, C, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , k1, k2)
≤ n ·
(
ε+ 20 · ε · log2 |X |
)
. (66)
Equation (66) comes from [56, pp. 19, Fano’s Inequality] and
n ≥ n9 =
1
ε and equations (44) and (45) which imply that
log2 |MV1 | ≤ 2n · log2 |X | and log2 |MV2 | ≤ n · log2 |X |.
D. Conclusion
For all ε > 0, there exists n¯, for all n ≥ n¯, there exists
HARQ-code c⋆ ∈ C(n,R, L) such that Pe
(
c⋆
∣∣k1, k2) ≤ ε
and Le
(
c⋆
∣∣k1, k2) ≤ ε, for all (k1, k2) ∈ Sc1(ε,R,R1,P⋆x ) ∩
S2(ε,R,R1,R2,P
⋆
x ).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
Proof. We assume that the random events (Bl)l∈{1,...,L} are
independent of the random events (Al)l∈{1,...,L}.
Pso = P
( L⋃
i=1
B
c
i
)
= 1− P
( L⋂
i=1
Bi
)
(67)
= 1−
L∑
j=1
P
( j⋂
i=1
Bi
∣∣∣∣L = j
)
· P
(
L = j
)
(68)
= 1−
L∑
j=1
P
( j⋂
i=1
Bi
)
· P
(
L = j
)
(69)
= 1−
L−1∑
j=2
P
( j⋂
i=1
Bi
)
·
(
P
( j−1⋂
i=1
A
c
i
)
− P
( j⋂
i=1
A
c
i
))
− P
(
B1
)
· P
(
A1
)
− P
( L⋂
i=1
Bi
)
· P
(L−1⋂
i=1
A
c
i
)
. (70)
(67) comes from the properties of the probability Pso.
(68) comes from the definition of the HARQ-code, if j
transmissions occurs, then
⋃L
i=1 B
c
i =
⋃j
i=1 B
c
i .
(69) comes from the independence of the events (Bl)l∈{1,...,L}
with events (Al)l∈{1,...,L} hence with transmission number L.
(70) comes from the probability of having L transmission.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 9
Proof. First Point. Increasing R decreases the connection
outage probability and does not affect the secrecy outage
probability. Hence we consider the secrecy rate R = 0.
Pco = 1− e
− 2
R1−1
γd ≤ ξc, Pso = e
− 2
R1−1
γe ≤ ξs. (71)
ξc and ξs are compatible if there exists R1 satisfying (71), i.e.,
log2
(
1− γe · ln(ξs)
)
≤ R1 ≤ log2
(
1− γd · ln
(
1− ξc
))
.
The existence of parameter R1 is given by the above inequal-
ities and this proves the first point of Theorem 9.
Second Point. The parameter R1 should satisfy :
log2(1− γe · ln(ξs)) ≤ R1 ≤ log2(1− γd · ln(1− ξc))− R.
Hence, the parameter R1 exists if and only if:
R ≤ log2
(
1− γd · ln(1− ξc)
1− γe · ln(ξs)
)
.
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